The Suffolk Bank and the Panic of 1837

The Suffolk Bank in Boston is well known as having been the clearinghouse for virtually all the banknotes that circulated in New England between 1836 and 1858. An examination of 19th century bank balance sheets shows that during and after the U.S. banking Panic of 1837, this private commercial bank also provided some services that today are provided by central banks. These include lending reserves to other banks (providing a discount window) and keeping the payments system operating. Because of Suffolk's activities, banks in New England fared better than banks elsewhere during the Panic of 1837. And after the panic, when much of the United States suffered a prolonged economic slowdown, New England fared better than the rest of the country, at least partly because of Suffolk’s central bank-like activities.Bank notes ; Banks and banking - History

In order to form a more perfect monetary union

Why did states agree to a U.S. Constitution that prohibits them from issuing their own money? This article argues that two common answers to this question—a fear of inflation and a desire to control what money qualifies as legal tender—do not fit the facts. The article proposes a better answer: a desire to form a viable monetary union that both eliminates the variability of exchange rates between various forms of money and avoids the seigniorage problem that otherwise occurs in a fixed exchange rate system. Supporting evidence is offered from three periods of U.S. history: the colonial period (1690–1776), the Revolutionary War (1776–83), and the Confederation period (1783–89). This article is adapted from a chapter prepared for a forthcoming book, Varieties of Monetary Reforms: Lessons and Experiences on the Road to Monetary Union, edited by Pierre Siklos, to be published by Kluwer Academic Publishers.Banks and banking - History ; Money theory

Lessons from a laissez-faire payments system: the Suffolk Banking System (1825-58)

A classic example of a privately created interbank payments system was operated by the Suffolk Bank of New England (1825–58). Known as the Suffolk Banking System, it was the nation’s first regionwide net-clearing system for bank notes. While it operated, notes of all New England banks circulated at par throughout the region. Some have concluded from this experience that unfettered competition in the provision of payments services can produce an efficient payments system. But another look at the history of the Suffolk Banking System questions this conclusion. The Suffolk Bank earned extraordinary profits, and note-clearing may have been a natural monopoly. There is no consensus in the literature about whether unfettered operation of markets with natural monopolies produces an efficient allocation of resources. ; Reprinted in Quarterly Review, Fall 2002 (v. 26. no. 4)Suffolk Banking System ; Payment systems

Quantitative Tverberg, Helly, & Carath\'eodory theorems

This paper presents sixteen quantitative versions of the classic Tverberg, Helly, & Caratheodory theorems in combinatorial convexity. Our results include measurable or enumerable information in the hypothesis and the conclusion. Typical measurements include the volume, the diameter, or the number of points in a lattice.Comment: 33 page

Lessons from a laissez-faire payments system: the Suffolk Banking System, 1825-58

Suffolk Banking System ; Banks and banking - History ; Payment systems ; Banks and banking - New England ; Clearinghouses (Banking)

Quantitative Tverberg theorems over lattices and other discrete sets

This paper presents a new variation of Tverberg's theorem. Given a discrete set $S$ of $R^d$, we study the number of points of $S$ needed to guarantee the existence of an $m$-partition of the points such that the intersection of the $m$ convex hulls of the parts contains at least $k$ points of $S$. The proofs of the main results require new quantitative versions of Helly's and Carath\'eodory's theorems.Comment: 16 pages. arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1503.0611

Quantitative combinatorial geometry for continuous parameters

We prove variations of Carath\'eodory's, Helly's and Tverberg's theorems where the sets involved are measured according to continuous functions such as the volume or diameter. Among our results, we present continuous quantitative versions of Lov\'asz's colorful Helly theorem, B\'ar\'any's colorful Carath\'eodory's theorem, and the colorful Tverberg theorem.Comment: 22 pages. arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1503.0611

Quantitative Combinatorial Geometry for Continuous Parameters

We prove variations of Carathéodory’s, Helly’s and Tverberg’s theorems where the sets involved are measured according to continuous functions such as the volume or diameter. Among our results, we present continuous quantitative versions of Lovász’s colorful Helly’s theorem, Bárány’s colorful Carathéodory’s theorem, and the colorful Tverberg’s theorem

Lessons from a laissez-faire payments system: the Suffolk Banking System (1825–1858)

The classic example of a privately created and well-functioning interbank payments system is the Suffolk Banking System that existed in New England between 1825 and 1858. This System, operated by the Suffolk Bank, was the first regionwide net-clearing system for bank notes in the United States. While it operated, notes of all New England banks circulated at par throughout the region. The achievements of the System have led some to conclude that unfettered competition in the provision of payments services can produce an efficient payments system. In this paper, we reexamine the history of the Suffolk Banking System and present some facts that call this conclusion into question. We find that the Suffolk Bank earned extraordinary profits and that note clearing may have been a natural monopoly. There is no consensus in the literature about whether unfettered operation of markets in the presence of natural monopolies produces an efficient allocation.Suffolk Banking System